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Sections 12, 13 and 14 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (as amended), provide a 
consumer  with  fundamental  and  inalienable  “rights”  when  purchasing  goods  or 
entering into a ‘Contract of Sale’ wherein “the seller transfers or agrees to transfer 
the  property  in  goods  to  the  buyer  for  a  money consideration,  called  the  price” 
(section 2(1)).  This note will  specifically address the first  of  these implied rights,  
section 12, in the context  of  current legislative change, although the overarching 
hypothesis is that the courts’ interpretation of this provision is both confusing and 
intrinsically unfair. 
Section 12(1) provides that:
 “In a contract of sale…there is an implied term on the part of the seller that in 
the case of a sale he has a right to sell  the goods, and in the case of an 
agreement to sell he will have such a right at the time when the property is to 
pass”. 
This simply codified this traditional common law position, and concerns the right to 
sell and not the transfer of title, which means that the seller need not be the legal  
owner  of  the  goods,  provided  he possesses  the  authority  to  sell.  Consequently, 
although the right to sell and ownership are generally co-existent, this is not always 
so. For example, an agent does not own goods, but derives an authority or right to  
sell from his or her principal and, more unusually, ownership may be encumbered by 
third  party  rights,  thereby  negating  a  right  to  sell,  as  happened  in  Niblett v 
Confectioners Materials [1921]  3 K.B. 387, where injunctive relief was granted to 
prevent the defendant owners of tins of condensed milk from selling these whilst 
their labels bore the registered trademark of a competing manufacturer; ownership 
did not create a coterminous right to sell and conferred a power on the trademark 
holder  to,  in  effect,  prevent  the  sale. It  is  worthwhile  noting  that  this  further 
constituted a breach of section 12(2)(b), requiring  that “the buyer will  enjoy quiet 
possession of the goods except so far as it may be disturbed by the owner or other  
person entitled to the benefit of any charge or encumbrance so disclosed or known.”
Section 12 breach
By virtue of section 6(1)(a) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, liability for breach 
of  the  obligations  arising  under  section  12  cannot  be  excluded  or  restricted  by 
reference to any contract term (subject to the contracts excepted in that Act), and 
section  12(5A)  confirms  that  the  obligation  under  section  12(1)  is  a  contractual 
condition,  the  legal  basis  of  which  is  that  there  has  been  a  total  failure  of  
consideration or, more specifically, the buyer did get any of what he paid for as the 
seller did not have the right to sell. The fallacious nature of this supposition is best  
highlighted  by  Rowland v  Divall [1923]  2  KB  500,  a  case  doubtless  familiar  to 
commercial practitioners and academics alike. 
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Simply put, the claimant, a motor dealer, purchased a car from the defendant for 
£334. Two months later, he sold it to a local buyer for £400. After this buyer had 
used the car for a further two months, the car was repossessed by the police as  
having  been  stolen.  The  claimant  repaid  the  £400  to  the  buyer  and  sued  the 
defendant  for  return  of  the  £334  purchase  price.  In  reversing  the  first  instance 
decision of Bray J., the Court of Appeal concluded that there had been a total failure 
of  consideration.  The  claimant  had  bargained  for  ownership  not  use.  The  four 
months use was regarded as irrelevant and no set off (or a sum deducted to take 
into account any advantage received or detriment suffered) was allowed for such 
extensive use, with Atkin LJ opining (at 507) that the buyer had:
“not received any part of that which he contracted to receive - namely, the 
property and right to possession - and, that being so, there has been a total 
failure of consideration. The plaintiff is entitled to recover the £334 which he 
paid.”
Such restitution was supported by Bankes LJ, who commented (at 504) that it could 
not “possibly be said that the plaintiff received any portion of what he had agreed to  
buy…namely  a  car  to  which  he  would  have  title”,  and  could  recover  all  of  the 
purchase  money.  Essentially,  this  would  appear  to  countenance  the  right  to 
extensive free use of the goods without the buyer having to make allowance for the 
often extensive use he has received, despite such constituting consideration within 
most accepted definitions. Furthermore, we are told by Mason v Burningham [1949] 
2 KB 545, that where a buyer has incurred other losses or expenses, for example 
repairs, these can also be claimed from the seller. Although the Law Commission 
has suggested that such “unjustified enrichment would not be solved by requiring the 
buyer of goods with defective title to make a money allowance in favour of another 
person who also does not have a valid title to the goods” (Law Com No 160, Cmnd 
137 (1987)  at  57),  the view of  the Court  of  Appeal  in  Rowland v  Divall has not 
received universal approval: for example, the Law Reform Committee (1966; Cmnd. 
2958) argued that an allowance should be made for use by  the innocent buyer in 
such situations, and  Professor Atiyah has referred to the decision in  Rowland v 
Divall as  “a  fallacy”.  One  may  further  argue  that  such  a  position  is  directly 
contradictory  of  other  contractual  tenets:  for  example,  section  1  (3)  of  the  Law 
Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943, enables a party to recover (or deduct) an 
amount for a “valuable benefit” conferred before discharge as an exception to the full  
recovery  principle,  and  there  would  seem to  be  further  inconsistency with  other 
provisions of  the  Sale  of  Goods Act  –  particularly  section  35,  where  a buyer  is  
deemed to have “accepted” goods, thereby having a claim in damages only, where, 
if  after  a  reasonable  time,  he  fails  to  intimate  rejection  to  the  seller.  By  direct 
transposition into the context of Rowland v Divall, four months would appear too long 
a  time  to  enable  discharge,  and  so  difficulties  in  valuing  use  and  depreciation 
notwithstanding, there would seem to be a strong case for reform of the status quo.
Seismic legislative change
We are currently seeing a seismic change in the nature of consumer protection.  For 
example,  the  Consumer  Rights  Directive  is  being  introduced  through  several 
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statutory  instruments  to  include  The  Consumer  Rights  (Payment  Surcharges) 
Regulations  2012,  and  the  reform  of  distance  and  off-premises  sales  in  The 
Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 
2013  (which  supersede  the  Consumer  Protection  (Distance  Selling)  Regulations 
2000 and the Cancellation of Contracts made in a Consumer’s Home or Place of 
Work  etc  Regulations  2008).  These  latter  Regulations  provide  that  where  a 
consumer exercises their right to cancel a sales contract (pursuant to Regulation 29) 
and 
”the value of the goods is diminished by any amount as a result of handling of  
the goods by the consumer beyond what is necessary to establish the nature, 
characteristics  and  functioning  of  the  goods,  the  trader  may  recover  that 
amount from the consumer, up to the contract price ” (Regulation 34(9)).
For clarification, Regulation 34(12) states that -
“Handling is beyond what is necessary to establish the nature, characteristics 
and  functioning  of  the  goods  if,  in  particular,  it  goes  beyond  the  sort  of 
handling that might reasonably be allowed in a shop.” 
So, in the context of the cancellation of distance contracts, there will be a pecuniary  
charge  imposed  on  the  consumer  subject  to  the  above  criteria.  Such  is  clearly 
sensible, not least because any handling may well diminish the value of the goods 
and arguably constitutes use. On this basis, one may question why the unfettered 
use of a motor vehicle does not also provide the right to claim a suitable deduction 
from any refund granted upon breach of section 12? 
It is somewhat disappointing that the government has failed to address the Rowland 
v  Divall ‘injustice’ through its imminent ‘flagship’ Consumer Rights Bill 2013, prima 
facie  a  commendable  attempt  to  simplify  and  consolidate  a  number  of  areas of 
consumer protection under a single piece of legislation (due to come into force by 
October 2015), and to provide a new statutory regime for consumer contracts in such 
key areas as description, quality,  passing of property,  contracts for the supply of 
services and exemption clauses.  Significantly, although there will be a number of  
new provisions pertaining to remedies and digital content contracts, there will not be 
any change to the existing section 12, and a parallel provision appears in clause 16. 
This is surprising, more so when considering that the legislature has addressed its 
collective mind to the issue of ‘use’ elsewhere in the Bill. For example, as part of the 
overhaul of the remedy regime, any refund due to the consumer as a result of them 
exercising  their  “final  right  to  reject”  (where,  for  example,  the  goods  are  not  of 
satisfactory quality)  may be reduced to take account  of  any use of goods in the 
period since they were delivered. 
By way of counterbalance, it may be suggested that the aforementioned provisions 
in both the Consumer Rights Bill 2013 and The Consumer Contracts (Information, 
Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013, enabling a seller to deduct 
an element for use from any refund, is predicated (albeit impliedly) upon him or her 
having initial ownership and the “right to sell”.  However, such a justification would 
seem sophistic, and it is arguably the case that the real emphasis should be focused 
more on the unfairness of permitting a buyer the unfettered use and enjoyment from 
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goods, with the practical implication being that they obtain full restitution in the event 
of a breach of section 12. 
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